Bay AI agent security
Per Bay's pages, one script pushed through an existing MDM or EDR installs Wave, an ephemeral discovery binary, and Bay Enforcer decides allow, ask, deny or steer on credential access, shell commands and MCP connections before they run, with no proxy. Three third-party reports back the enforcement claims. One policy set spans endpoint, browser and cloud workspaces such as VMs, Kubernetes and Coder, and decision logs export to a SIEM in OCSF format. A gateway layer and named SaaS agent platforms such as Copilot Studio or Agentforce: none found on 16 Nov 2026. Bay is a young company that left stealth in 2026, publishes no price and has little independent testing behind its claims.
Facts read on .
Bay is a young company that left stealth in 2026, publishes no price and has little independent testing behind its claims.
Strength and weakness for AI Agent Security Solutions
Strength: One policy set enforces allow, ask, deny or steer across endpoint, browser and cloud workspaces, with SIEM export (bay-47, bay-37, bay-62).
Weakness: None found on 2026-11-16 for a gateway layer or named SaaS agent platforms such as Copilot Studio or Agentforce (bay-45, bay-39).
Scores and evidence
Bay is 4th in the overall ranking at 62.0 of 100. Each score below lists the fact ids behind it; the facts follow further down with their sources and read dates.
| Criterion | Score | Weight | Why | Facts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coverage: endpoint layer | 8 of 10 | 6 | The vendor covers coding agents, desktop assistants, CLI tools and MCP servers on devices, and third parties describe the on-machine native hook. | bay-14, bay-70, bay-72, bay-46, bay-55 |
| Coverage: browser layer | 6 of 10 | 6 | The vendor claims browser coverage including browser agents and blocking of domains, extensions and agentic actions; a browser list none found. | bay-12, bay-23, bay-24, bay-74, bay-75 |
| Coverage: cloud workspace layer | 5 of 10 | 6 | Cloud workspaces such as VMs, Kubernetes and Coder are covered; named SaaS agent platforms none found. | bay-37, bay-38, bay-40, bay-39 |
| Coverage: identity layer | 6 of 10 | 6 | The vendor shows credentials, secrets and permissions each agent can reach and attributes actions; formal revocation and least-privilege workflows are limited. | bay-41, bay-42, bay-43, bay-68 |
| Coverage: gateway layer | 0 of 10 | 6 | None found: the vendor uses an on-device control point and states it uses no proxy. | bay-45, bay-44 |
| Stops the action | 9 of 10 | 20 | The vendor decides allow, ask, deny or steer on credential access, shell commands and MCP connections before they run, confirmed by three third-party reports. | bay-47, bay-48, bay-53, bay-54, bay-55 |
| Visibility | 7 of 10 | 15 | An entity graph of agents, MCP servers, SaaS apps and access plus session timelines is described; vendor claims only. | bay-11, bay-29, bay-63, bay-76 |
| Deployment | 8 of 10 | 10 | One MDM or EDR script, no proxy and under five minutes are published and reported by third parties; a supported OS list none found. | bay-16, bay-17, bay-18, bay-19, bay-20, bay-21 |
| Policy and governance | 6 of 10 | 10 | IdP-scoped policy, simulation, decision logs and OCSF SIEM export are described; EDR, SOAR and ticketing integrations none found. | bay-30, bay-31, bay-59, bay-61, bay-62, bay-65 |
| Transparency | 1 of 10 | 10 | Documentation needs sign-in; a published price and published research none found. | bay-34, bay-35, bay-36 |
| Proof | 7 of 10 | 5 | Third parties report $50 million raised and name customers such as Micron and Wix; independent analyst coverage none found. | bay-06, bay-07, bay-08, bay-09 |
Where it ranks
| View | Rank | Total |
|---|---|---|
| Overall ranking | 4th | 62.0 |
| Ranked for the endpoint layer | 1st | 71.0 |
| Ranked for the browser layer | 2nd | 65.0 |
| Ranked for the cloud workspace layer | joint 5th | 62.0 |
| Ranked for the identity layer | 4th | 65.0 |
| Ranked for the gateway layer | 16th | 47.0 |
Product, deployment, price and owner
- Product assessed: Bay platform: Endpoint, Cloud Workspaces and Browser, with AI Security Posture and Agent Runtime Enforcement
- Deployment: Agentless: one script through an existing MDM or EDR runs Wave, an ephemeral binary; Bay Enforcer, a static binary, decides on the device via native hook; no proxy (vendor claims)
- Time to deploy: Under 5 minutes, as claimed by the vendor; proof of value in under 14 days (SecurityWeek quote)
- Price: none found on 2026-11-16
- Owner: Bay AI, Inc.
- Website: bay.io
Facts and sources
bay-01 (vendor): Bay AI, Inc. publishes the Bay site and states its copyright on every page.
Quote: "© 2026 Bay AI, Inc. All rights reserved."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-02 (vendor): Bay says it was founded by three engineers from endpoint and API security.
Quote: "Bay was founded by three engineers who spent their careers solving the hardest problems in endpoint and API security."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-03 (third-party): On 2026-11-10 Bay named its leadership: Yuval Zacharia is CEO and co-founder, Aner Morag is CPO and Boris Danilovich is VP of R&D, per SiliconANGLE.
Quote: "Zacharia founded Bay with Chief Product Officer Aner Morag and Vice President of Research and Development Boris Danilovich."
Source: siliconangle.com, read .
bay-04 (vendor): Bay says it was founded in 2026 and is headquartered in Tel Aviv; its press release is dated 2026-11-10.
Quote: "Founded in 2026, Bay is headquartered in Tel Aviv and serves customers in the United States and Europe."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-05 (vendor): On 2026-11-10 Bay said it had raised $50 million in total funding.
Quote: "Bay has raised $50 million in total funding."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-06 (third-party): On 2026-11-11 SecurityWeek reported Bay emerged from stealth with a $37 million Series A led by Battery Ventures plus a $13 million seed.
Quote: "emerged from stealth with $50 million funding (comprising a $37 million Series A round led by Battery Ventures"
Source: securityweek.com, read .
bay-07 (third-party): On 2026-11-10 SiliconANGLE reported Micron, Wix, ClickUp and Peloton are among dozens of Bay enterprise customers.
Quote: "Micron Technology Inc., Wix.com Ltd., ClickUp Inc. and Peloton Interactive Inc. are among the dozens of enterprise customers signed in the nine months since Bay was founded."
Source: siliconangle.com, read .
bay-08 (third-party): The Next Web noted that Bay did not name its Fortune 100 customers or say how it measured the tripling claim, and that one named customer is also an investor.
Quote: "The company did not name those customers or say how it measured the figure, and TNW has not verified it."
Source: thenextweb.com, read .
bay-09 (none-found): None found on 2026-11-16: independent analyst coverage of Bay (Gartner, Forrester or similar) on the Bay home page or blog.
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-10 (vendor): Bay says it is SOC 2 and ISO 27001 certified.
Quote: "SOC 2 & ISO 27001 Certified"
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-11 (vendor): Bay says shadow AI discovery covers agents, models, MCP servers, extensions and skills plus AI built into approved tools, across devices, browsers and cloud workloads.
Quote: "Every agent, model, MCP server, extension and skill, plus the AI built into tools your teams already use, across devices, browsers and cloud workloads."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-12 (vendor): Bay says its browser coverage finds AI tools, extensions and accounts in every browser.
Quote: "Find every AI tool, extension and account in every browser, and keep company data out of personal AI."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-14 (vendor): Bay says its endpoint product finds agents, extensions, CLI tools, MCP servers, skills and models on employee devices.
Quote: "Bay finds every agent, extension, CLI tool, MCP server, skill and model on employee devices."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-16 (vendor): Bay says it deploys with one script through an existing MDM, with no proxy and nothing installed by users.
Quote: "Bay deploys with one script through an existing MDM. It does not require a proxy to route traffic through and does not require anything to be installed by users."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-17 (vendor): Bay says it is agentless and deploys via MDM or EDR using Wave, an ephemeral binary, with no persistent agent and no proxy.
Quote: "Bay is agentless: it deploys through your existing MDM or EDR using Wave, an ephemeral binary, so there’s no persistent agent to maintain and no proxy in the path."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-18 (vendor): Bay says the endpoint inventory appears in under 5 minutes.
Quote: "Bay brings it all into view in under 5 minutes and keeps it in bounds, without slowing anyone down."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-19 (third-party): On 2026-11-10 SiliconANGLE reported Bay installs through the customer's existing MDM or EDR and the company says it takes under five minutes.
Quote: "Bay installs through the mobile device management or endpoint detection and response tools a customer already has, and the company says it takes under five minutes."
Source: siliconangle.com, read .
bay-20 (third-party): On 2026-11-11 SecurityWeek quoted Bay saying a fleet deploys in under five minutes and a proof of value completes in under 14 days.
Quote: "complete a proof of value in less than 14 days."
Source: securityweek.com, read .
bay-21 (none-found): None found on 2026-11-16: a list of supported operating systems for the Bay endpoint scanner, on the endpoint product page and the platform page.
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-22 (vendor): Bay says it identifies personal versus corporate AI accounts including in personal Chrome profiles; no full browser list was found.
Quote: "including in personal Chrome profiles"
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-23 (vendor): Bay says browser guardrails keep personal data, secrets and source code out of prompts, with allow, warn, steer or block per team.
Quote: "Keep personal data, secrets and source code out of prompts, and decide what to, Allow, Warn, Steer or Block, tailored to each team."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-24 (vendor): Bay says it can allow or block specific AI domains and extensions and stop risky agentic actions inside the browser.
Quote: "Bay lets you allow or block specific AI domains and extensions, and stops risky agentic actions inside the browser"
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-26 (vendor): Bay says every plugin, package, skill and MCP server is scanned and vetted before approval and each time it changes.
Quote: "Every plugin, package, skill and MCP server is scanned and vetted before it’s approved and every time it changes."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-29 (vendor): Bay says it builds an entity graph of the user behind each agent, the MCP servers and SaaS apps it touches, and the access it holds.
Quote: "Bay builds a contextual entity graph of how everything connects: the user behind each agent, the MCP servers and SaaS apps it touches, and the access it holds."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-30 (vendor): Bay says it connects to the identity provider so policies apply to the right people and groups.
Quote: "Bay connects to your identity provider, so every policy applies to the right people and groups, and keeps up as your organization changes."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-31 (vendor): Bay says policies can be scoped by IdP group, device or runtime and can set which MCP servers may read or write.
Quote: "Policies can be scoped by IdP group, device or runtime, and can set which MCP servers can read or write"
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-34 (observed): Bay documentation at docs.bay.io redirects to a sign-in page and is open only to signed-in Bay users.
Quote: "The Bay documentation is open only to signed-in Bay users."
Source: docs.bay.io, read .
bay-35 (none-found): None found on 2026-11-16: a published price. The site has no pricing page (bay.io/pricing returns 404) and the demo page only offers a 30-minute demo.
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-36 (none-found): None found on 2026-11-16: published research, threat reports or open-source code; the Bay blog lists only two announcement posts dated 2026-11-10.
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-37 (vendor): Bay says it discovers agents across virtual machines, Kubernetes, Coder workspaces and hosted sessions, with the MCP servers and skills each uses.
Quote: "Discover every agent across virtual machines, Kubernetes, Coder workspaces and hosted sessions, along with the MCP servers and skills each one uses."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-38 (vendor): Bay says teams run Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI and GitHub Copilot in cloud workspaces and that Bay covers them.
Quote: "Teams now run agents like Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI and GitHub Copilot in clusters, cloud workspaces and hosted sessions"
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-39 (none-found): None found on 2026-11-16: named support for SaaS agent platforms (Microsoft Copilot Studio, Salesforce Agentforce, ServiceNow, AWS Bedrock agents) on the cloud workspaces page.
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-40 (third-party): On 2026-11-10 SiliconANGLE reported Bay tracks agents on a laptop, in a cloud workload or in a SaaS application under one policy set.
Quote: "whether they sit on an employee’s laptop, inside a cloud workload or in a software-as-a-service application"
Source: siliconangle.com, read .
bay-41 (vendor): Bay says it shows which credentials, secrets and permissions each cloud agent can reach so risky ones can be locked down.
Quote: "See which credentials, secrets and permissions each cloud agent can reach, and lock down the risky ones before a long-running task puts them to use."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-42 (vendor): Bay says it finds credentials, tokens and secrets that agents and MCP servers can read and helps lock them down.
Quote: "Bay finds the credentials, tokens and secrets that agents and MCP servers can read, and helps you lock them down before a long-running task puts them to use."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-43 (vendor): Bay says it attributes each action to the person or the agent acting for them and records the agent's permission mode.
Quote: "Bay attributes each action to the person who took it or the agent that acted for them, and records the permission mode the agent was running in."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-44 (vendor): Bay says it uses no proxy; decisions are made on the device.
Quote: "No proxy: every decision is made on the device."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-45 (none-found): None found on 2026-11-16: a gateway or proxy product between agents and models, tools or MCP servers; Bay pages describe an on-device control point instead.
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-46 (third-party): On 2026-11-10 SiliconANGLE reported the AI tool hands each proposed action to Bay Enforcer, a static binary, through a native hook on the machine.
Quote: "Each time an agent proposes an action, the AI tool running it hands the request to Bay Enforcer, a static binary, through a native hook."
Source: siliconangle.com, read .
bay-47 (vendor): Bay says runtime enforcement decides allow, ask, deny or steer on every action, locally and in milliseconds with no cloud round-trip.
Quote: "Bay reads each agent’s whole session to understand its intent, then decides on every action: allow, ask, deny or steer."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-48 (vendor): Bay says it acts on credential access, risky shell commands and untrusted MCP server connections in milliseconds.
Quote: "When an agent reaches for credentials, runs a risky shell command or connects to an untrusted MCP server, Bay allows, asks, denies or steers the action in milliseconds"
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-49 (vendor): Bay says endpoint decisions are made on the device in under 4ms.
Quote: "allowing, asking, denying or steering it right on the device in under 4ms"
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-51 (vendor): Bay says it can prevent prompt injection attempts at runtime.
Quote: "Bay can also prevent prompt injection attempts at runtime"
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-53 (third-party): On 2026-11-10 SiliconANGLE reported that anything Bay judges too risky never runs.
Quote: "Anything judged too risky never runs."
Source: siliconangle.com, read .
bay-54 (third-party): On 2026-11-11 SecurityWeek reported Bay decides in milliseconds to allow, refer to the user, redirect or deny each action.
Quote: "decides in milliseconds whether to allow the action, refer it to the user, redirect it based on policy, or simply deny it"
Source: securityweek.com, read .
bay-55 (third-party): On 2026-11-10 The Next Web reported Bay checks every action an agent proposes before it runs, then allows, blocks or asks a person.
Quote: "It checks every action an agent proposes before it runs, then allows it, blocks it or asks a person."
Source: thenextweb.com, read .
bay-58 (vendor): Bay says it applies intent-aware enforcement on every tool call in cloud agents.
Quote: "Intent-aware enforcement on every tool call."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-59 (vendor): Bay says any policy can run in simulation to show what it would allow, ask, deny or steer before users are affected.
Quote: "Run any policy in simulation to see what each rule would allow, ask, deny or steer, before a single user is affected."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-60 (vendor): Bay says it replays 30 days of agent history to show what a policy would do before enforcement.
Quote: "Before enforcement, Bay replays 30 days of agent history to show what a policy would do before any user is affected."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-61 (vendor): Bay says every decision is logged against the policy behind it for auditors.
Quote: "Every decision is logged against the policy behind it, ready for your auditors."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-62 (vendor): Bay says events reach the customer SIEM in OCSF format.
Quote: "Events arrive in your SIEM in OCSF format, with enough context that analysts can triage without opening another console."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-63 (vendor): Bay says it records every prompt, tool call and system action on one timeline per session.
Quote: "Every prompt, tool call and system action on one timeline, so you can see how an agent got from its first instruction to its last action."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-64 (vendor): Bay says it maps policies and activity to OWASP LLM Top 10, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and ISO/IEC 42001.
Quote: "Bay links your policies and the activity behind them to the OWASP LLM Top 10, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and ISO/IEC 42001"
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-65 (none-found): None found on 2026-11-16: named EDR, SOAR or ticketing integrations beyond SIEM export, on the investigation page.
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-66 (vendor): Bay says it flags risky configurations such as bypass-permissions mode and sandboxes switched off, rates severity and shows the fix.
Quote: "Bypass-permissions mode, sandboxes switched off, unrestricted tool access. Bay spots each one, rates how serious it is and shows you how to fix it."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-67 (vendor): Bay says it finds toxic combinations such as an agent that can read secrets and also reach the internet.
Quote: "Some risks only appear together, like an agent that can read secrets and also reach the internet."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-68 (vendor): Bay's product walkthrough says a discovered Claude Code install was connected to Salesforce, Atlassian and Sentry and could read plaintext secrets in its MCP configs.
Quote: "the agent can read plaintext secrets in its MCP configs, as well as AWS and SSH keys on disk"
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-70 (vendor): Bay names Claude Code and Cursor as coding agents it secures on the endpoint.
Quote: "How do you secure AI coding agents like Claude Code and Cursor on the endpoint?"
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-72 (vendor): Bay describes its endpoint scope as coding agents, desktop assistants, MCP servers and skills on employee devices.
Quote: "Coding agents, desktop assistants, MCP servers and skills, working with access to code, data and production environments."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-73 (vendor): Bay says it follows each coding agent session from prompt to tool call to system action.
Quote: "Bay secures AI coding agents by following each session from prompt to tool call to system action."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-74 (vendor): Bay says it provides AI browser security across the browsers a team already uses and covers browsers that act on their own.
Quote: "Bay provides AI browser security across the browsers your teams already use."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-75 (vendor): Bay says browser agents that click and type on their own are in scope.
Quote: "and now browsers that click and type on their own"
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-76 (vendor): Bay says its records include full transcripts of prompts, actions and MCP calls traceable to a person.
Quote: "Full transcripts of prompts, actions and MCP calls - traceable to the person behind each session."
Source: bay.io, read .
bay-77 (none-found): None found on 2026-11-16: a per-server allowlist or registry for MCP servers beyond scoping which servers may read or write; see approval workflow mention.
Source: bay.io, read .